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Case No. 20150317-CA 
INTHE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff! Appellee, 
v. 
TIMOTHY NOBLE WALKER, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from a conviction for aggravated assault, a third 
degree felony. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-
103(2)(e) (West Supp. 2012). 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendant punched his wife and then strangled her to 
unconsciousness in a violent domestic dispute. He was charged with 
aggravated assault causing serious bodily injury. The trial court also 
instructed jurors on two lesser-included offenses: aggravated assault likely 
to cause serious bodily injury, and assault. The jury convicted Defendant of 
the first lesser-included offense, aggravated assault likely to cause serious 
bodily injury. 
The only question on appeal is whether the trial court's strangulation 
instruction-"strangulation to the point of unconsciousness constitutes 
serious bodily injury" -comported with Utah law. It did. The Utah 
Supreme Court has long held that strangulation to unconsciousness 
constitutes serious bodily injury as a matter of law. Thus, the trial court's 
strangulation instruction was a correct statement of law that this Court is 
bound to uphold. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Did the trial court properly instruct the jury that strangulation to 
unconsciousness is serious bodily injury? 
Standard of Review. Jury instructions are reviewed for correctness. 
Green v. Louder, 2001 UT 62, if 14, 29 P.3d 638. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are 
reproduced in Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (West 2015) (aggravated 
assault); 





STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Summary of facts. 1 
Defendant punched his wife and then strangled her to 
unconsciousness in a violent domestic dispute. R162:81,83-84,86-88,108,111. 
* * * 
Defendant and Ann Hilton had been married less than a month vvhen 
Ann's work transferred her to Utah from South Carolina. R162:102-03. The 
couple moved to Salt Lake City with Ann's then 14-year-old son, Anthony. 
R162:73. Defendant, Ann, and Anthony, stayed in a motel when they first 
arrived. R162:104. Defendant drove Ann to and from her work; he was not 
working. R162:105. 
After Defendant picked up Ann from work on 15 January 2015, the 
couple began drinking and arguing a little in their motel ro01n. R162:92,105. 
At one point, Defendant got into bed and put his drink on the nightstand. 
R162:76. Ann took the drink off the nightstand and put it in the freezer. Id. 
Defendant got out of bed, removed the drink from the freezer, and put it 
back on the nightstand. Id. After Ann then poured the drink down the sink, 
Defendant got back out of bed and "cold cocked" her on the right side of 
1 Because this is an appeal from a jury verdict, the State presents the 
facts in the light most favorable to the verdict. See State v. Bond, 2015 UT 88, 
13, n.2, 361 P.3d 104. 
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her face. R162:76-77,130. Ann "fell against the refrigerator" and "slid 
halfway down to the floor," .,,holding her face." R162:78. Defendant lay 
back down on the bed. R162:78. 2 
Ann got back up and began searching Defendant's jacket for her debit 
card and the keys to the family van. R162:78. Upon finding her keys, Ann 
put them in her pocket. R162:79. Defendant again got out of bed, came up 
behind Ann, and-after putting his right arm around her throat-lifted Ann 
onto her toes, using his left hand to search her pockets for the van keys. 
R162:79,81,110-111. When Defendant could not find the keys, he grabbed 
his right hand with his left and- again squeezing Ann's throat-lifted her 
completely off the floor. R162:80. 
Anthony watched his mother struggle unsuccessfully to free herself. 
Id. at 84. He also heard her make "choking sounds" just before "her eyes 
like rolled back in her head and she went limp." Id. at 84-85. Defendant 
then "pushed" Ann away from him and-after grabbing the van keys and 
his belongings- fled the motel room. Id. at 86-87. Ann "fell against the wall 
with her face and just sat there," remaining unconscious for approximately 
a minute. Id. at 86-88. Anthony dialed 911. R162:88. 
2 While Anthony recalled that the punch knocked his 1nother down, 
Ann did not recall falling after Defendant hit her. See R162:109. But she did 
remember Defendant saying, "Yes, I hit the bitch this time." Id. 
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Officer Fano, from the South Salt Lake Police Department, responded. 
R162:134. He noted visible 1narks above Ann's right eye, and "what 
appeared to be very fresh red marks on her neck," which itself "appeared 
swollen." R162:139; see also State's Exhibits 3-5. Ann declined to be taken to 
a hospital because she did not want to leave Anthony alone; in any event, 
none of her injuries required immediate medical attention. R162:114,149.3 
Ann told Officer Pano that she had difficulty remembering what happened 
because she was in a state of shock. R162:112. After talking to Anthony, 
Officer Pano called Defendant's cellphone. R162:138,141. Defendant did not 
answer the first few calls. R162:141. Eventually, Defendant answered, and 
after the officer identified himself, Defendant said, "I'm driving out of the 
state, don't worry about me," and hung up. R162:141. Officer Pano called 
Defendant a second time and received the same response. R162:142. When 
Officer Pano called a third time, Defendant said "there's nothing to talk 
about," "you can believe whatever you want to believe," and "suck my d-
3 Ann saw a doctor approximately 10 days later for an unrelated 
thumb injury, and because her "head was hurting." R162:125. The medical 
record of that visit indicated that Ann was "assaulted about one week ago," 
that she continued "to have pain, face, neck and left thumb," that she uwas 
hit to the face and choked," but that she was experiencing "no numbness, 
no weakness," although her neck was "[p]ositive for pain with movement." 
R162:131. The report further stated that Ann had "[m]ild, tender, swelling 
around the right eye," and that her neck muscles were tender. Id. 
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k," before hanging up. R162:142. Further attempts to call Defendant were 
unsuccessful. R162:142. 
B. Summary of proceedings. 
Defendant was charged with aggravated assault causing serious 
bodily injury, a second degree felony, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103(1)(b), 
(2)(b) (West 2015).4 Rl-2. "'Serious Bodiiy Injury' means bodily injury that 
creates or causes serious permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or 
impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ, or creates a 
substantial risk of death." Utah Code Ann.§ 76-1-601(11) (West 2015). 
Before trial, both parties filed notice that they planned to call experts 
to testify about strangulation. See R35,81. 
The State also proposed a jury instruction that stated the statutory 
definition of "serious bodily injury" -i.e., "injury that creates or causes 
serious permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the 
function of any bodily member or organ, or creates a substantial risk of 
death." R77 (quoting Section 76-1-601(11)). Additionally, the State 
4 The State cites to the current aggravated assault statute because, 
although the 2015 amendment rewrote subsection 76-5-103(1 ), it effected no 
substantive change. Rather, the 2015 amendment merely incorporated the 
language of the assault statute that the aggravated assault statute had 
previously referenced solely by citation. 
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requested an instruction "that strangulation to the point of unconsciousness 
constitutes serious bodily injury." R78. 
Defense counsel opposed the strangulation instruction on the ground 
that it took O that factual decision that the jury [has] to make on that 
particular element out of their hands" and violated his right to have the 
"jury find unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt" "every element of 
the offense." R162:4 (pertinent transcript pages are attached in Addendum 
B). Defense counsel argued that his expert would testify that it was 
possible to choke someone to unconsciousness without causing serious 
bodily injury. R162:4-5. Counsel argued that the instruction was akin to the 
trial court improperly "taking judicial notice of a particular set of facts and 
informing the jury that this set of facts has this legal consequence." R162:6. 
The prosecutor argued that the proposed strangulation instruction 
was based on two Utah Supreme Court decisions, State v. Speer, 750 P.2d 186 
(Utah 1988), and State v. Fisher, 680 P.2d 35 (Utah 1984), both holding that 
strangulation is serious bodily injury. R162:6-10. The prosecutor disputed 
that the proposed strangulation instruction took an element of aggravated 
assault from the jury; rather, it was" an instruction on what the law is. The 
jury is still the finder of fact." R162:10-11. For example, the jury still had to 
detennine whether the evidence supported beyond a reasonable doubt that 
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Defendant strangled Ann, and if so, whether he strangled her to 
unconsciousness. R162:1 l,15. Finally, the prosecutor disputed that the 
defense expert should be allowed to testify that unconsciousness did not 
constitute serious bodily injury. R162:11,14. 
On rebuttal, defense counsel reiterated that the proposed 
strangulation instruction violated Defendant's constitutional right to a jury 
verdict based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt. R162:19. Defense 
counsel also clarified that his expert would not testify that unconsciousness 
did not constitute serious bodily injury; rather, he would "explain ... the 
sort of different levels of injury ... without making that legal conclusion." 
R162:20. 
The trial court ruled that the State's proposed strangulation 
instruction was "a correct statement of law," and adopted it. R162:21; see 
also R109 (Instruction 18) (copies of all pertinent Instructions are attached in 
Addendum C). 
The State ultimately elected not to call an expert. Defendant 
presented expert testimony from a former emergency room doctor- Dr. 
Rothfeder. See R162:156-166. Rothfeder testified that strangulation can 
result in two types of injuries- i.e., neck fractures and brain damage. 
R162:158-159. While fractures could occur in a matter of seconds, it would 
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take approximately 2-3 minutes of sustained compression to cause brain 
damage. R162:159,165. According to Rothfeder, it was "not realistic that 15 
seconds of manual compression" would "cause death by brain damage." 
R162:165. However, applying pressure to the carotid sinus could cause 
someone to faint in as little as ten to fifteen seconds, but the person would 
also quickly recover once the pressure was removed. R162:161. Rothfeder 
explained that this type of "submission hold" is used by professional cage 
fighters because it "is specifically aimed at putting pressure on the carotid 
sinus and the carotid artery so people go to sleep in, you know, maybe 10 
seconds if that." Id. Rothfeder also described the physical symptoms of a 
strangulation injury, e.g., petechia, or pin-sized hemorrhages "in the whites 
of the eyes," and "in the skin of the face." R162:164. Also, "ligature marks," 
or "bruising from gripping and fingertips," and "cracks or fractures in the 
neck cartilages." Id. According to Rothfeder, an intoxicated person's brain 
is "more fragile." Id. 
On cross examination, Rothfeder acknowledged that he had not 
worked in an emergency room for nearly a decade, and that he had not seen 
any strangulation patients in that time. R162:167-168. He also 
acknowledged that it was possible for a person to be strangled to 
unconsciousness without exhibiting any signs of petechial hemorrhage or 
-9-
the other symptoms he described. See R162:171-172. He also affirmed that 
he had never conducted any original research or published any articles or 
books, including chapters in books, on strangulation; nor had he read any 
books on strangulation. R162:172. 
The trial court instructed jurors on aggravated assault causing serious 
bodily injury, see R111 (Instruction 20), and two lesser included offenses: 
aggravated assault likely to cause serious bodily injury, and assault, see 
R108,110,112-113 (Instructions 17,19,21,&22). The trial court included 
instructions on bodily injury- i.e., "physical pain, illness or an impairment 
or physical condition," an element of the lesser-included offense of assault, 
and serious bodily injury-Le., "injury that creates or causes serious 
permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the function of 
any bodily 1nember or organ, or creates a substantial risk of death," an 
element of both the charged offense (aggravated assault causing serious 
bodily injury) and the first lesser-included offense (aggravated assault likely 
to cause serious bodily injury). R108 (Instruction 17). As noted, the trial 
court also instructed jurors that "strangulation to the point of 
unconsciousness constitutes serious bodily injury." R109 (Instruction 18). 5 
5 Copies of pertinent instructions are attached in Addendum B. 
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In closing, the prosecutor argued that jurors should convict 
Defendant of aggravated assault causing serious bodily injury, as opposed 
to either of the two lesser included offenses, because the evidence showed 
that Defendant strangled Ann to unconsciousness. See R162:196-200. 
Defense counsel disputed that Defendant choked Ann to 
unconsciousness, challenging both Ann and Anthony's credibility on the 
basis that their "memories have changed about what happened," and that 
"the allegations just seem to get worse as time goes by." R162:204. Counsel 
also emphasized Rothfeder' s testimony that it would take two to three 
minutes of choking to induce brain injury or death, and that while 
strangling someone for ten to fifteen seconds could cause unconsciousness, 
the person could also quick! y regain consciousness and go "back to 
normal." R162:206. But even if Ann did pass out here, counsel disputed 
whether that was a result of Defendant's strangulation or of Ann hitting her 
head when she fell. R162:206,210. 
Counsel also argued that jurors should acquit Defendant of the 
charged and lesser-included offenses, but acknowledged that Ann suffered 
bodily injury; therefore, the lesser-included-offense of simple assault made 
"the most sense." R162:207. In support, counsel argued that temporary 
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unconsciousness did not constitute serious bodily injury under the statutory 
definition of serious bodily: 
That is not protracted mJury, that is not permanent 
disfigurement, that is not impairment of the function of any 
bodily member or organ or creating a substantial risk of death. 
Not all choking situations are created equally and this was one 
where it should have never happened if it happened, but ... 
Ann went on with her life without interruption. 
R162:208. Because Ann suffered at most temporary unconsciousness, 
counsel argued that the State had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt 
that she suffered serious bodily injury. R162:209-10. Defense counsel 
concluded that the evidence did not therefore support "either of the 
varieties" of aggravated assault in the jury instructions and jurors should 
therefore convict Defendant of the lesser-included offense of assault: "This 
was an assault, plain and simple, this was an assault and that's how you 
should come back with your verdict." R162:210. 
On rebuttal, the prosecutor reiterated that under Utah law, 
"strangulation to the point of unconsciousness constitutes serious bodily 
injury." R162:213. Jurors thus needed only to determine whether Ann in 
fact lost consciousness. Id. If jurors were "firmly convinced that she was 
strangled to unconsciousness," then Defendant "was guilty of aggravated 




During deliberations, the jury asked the trial court to define 
"constitutes" as that term was used in Insh·uction 18- the strangulation 
instruction: "What is the definition of constitutes as in Instruction 18?" 
R162:221; see also Rl 17. After conferring with the parties, the trial court 
instructed the jury as follows: "Use the common and ordinary meaning of 
the word. A dictionary meaning is to amount to or add up to." R162:224. 
Defense counsel objected to only the last sentence of the instruction, where 
the trial court provided an actual dictionary meaning of the term. Id. 
The jury convicted Defendant of the first lesser-included offense, 
aggravated assault likely to cause serious bodily injury. R87. The trial court 
imposed the statutory prison tenn of zero-to-five years. R145. The trial 
court then suspended the prison term and placed Defendant probation for 
48-months. Id. Thereafter, at Defendant's request, the trial court amended 
the sentence to re-impose the statutory prison term. R150. Defendant 
timely appealed. R152. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant argues that the trial court's strangulation instruction-
" strangulation to the point of unconsciousness constitutes serious bodily 
injury" - did not comport with Utah law and thus took an element away 
from the jury. But the Utah Supreme Court has long held that strangulation 
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to unconsciousness constitutes serious bodily injury as a matter of law. 
Accordingly, the trial court's instruction was a correct statement of Utah 
law that this Court is bound to uphold. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY 
THAT STRANGULATION TO UNCONSCIOUSNESS IS 
SERIOUS BODILY INJURY 
Defendant argues that the trial court's strangulation instruction took 
an element away from the jury in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. R109 (Instruction 18); see Aplt.Br.12. Defendant argues that 
"whether an act of choking constitutes force likely to cause serious bodily 
injury and whether the injury caused by an act of choking constitutes 
serious bodily injury are questions for the jury." Aplt.Br.15. In support, 
Defendant cites a sufficiency case from the Utah Supreme Court, two cases 
from this Court, 11 extra-jurisdictional cases," and Utah's "non-criminal 
code." See Aplt.Br.19-25. But under decades-old authority from the Utah 
Supreme Court, strangulation to unconsciousness is serious bodily injury as 
a matter of law. See State v. Fishet, 680 P.2d 35, 37 (Utah 1984). The trial 
court's strangulation instruction was thus a correct statement of law that 
this Court is bound to uphold. 
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*** 
Under Utah's graduated statutory sche1ne, a person commits assault, 
a class B misdemeanor, when, with unlawful force or violence, he "causes 
bodily injury to another or creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to 
another." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102(1)-(2) (West 2015). "'Bodily injury' 
means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition." 
Utah Code Ann.§ 76-1-601(3) (West 2015). 
A person is guilty of aggravated assault, a third degree felony, when 
the assault is accomplished by "means or force likely to produce death or 
serious bodily injury." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103(l)(b)-(2)(a) (emphasis 
added). A person is guilty of aggravated assault, a second degree felony, 
when the assault "results in serious bodily injury." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
103(2)(b) (emphasis added). "Serious bodily injury" is "bodily injury that 
creates or causes serious permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or 
impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ, or creates a 
substantial risk of death." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(11). 
For purposes of the aggravated assault statute, the Utah Supreme 
Court has held that strangulation to unconsciousness is serious bodily 
injury as a matter of law. See Fisher, 680 P.2d at 37. In Fisher, the defendant 
fatally strangled a prostitute whom he suspected was having an affair with 
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his wife. See 680 P.2d at 36. He "was charged with three variations of 
second degree murder: intent to kill, intent to cause serious bodily injury, 
and acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to 
human life." Id. at 37. In opening statement, the prosecutor said that 
Fisher's friend would testify that Fisher repeatedly threatened the victim's 
life, declared that if he could "do away" with her, then his wife "would 
come back to him," and also described "different methods" that he would 
use to kill the victim, including strangulation. Id. Although Fisher's friend 
testified to most of these statements at preliminary hearing, and was 
subpoenaed to testify at Fisher's trial, the friend ultimately refused to testify 
"due to threats he had received from fellow inmates at the Utah State 
Prison." Id. Fisher moved unsuccessfully for a mistrial based on the 
prosecutor's opening statement. Id. 
Although Fisher's friend did not testify, the State produced other 
evidence of Fisher's intent that "was not as strong as it would have been 
under the anticipated testimony," but which still "gave the jury a basis to 
infer [Fisher's] intent to kill" the victim. Id. at 38. Fisher also testified and 
admitted the strangulation, but claimed that he did not intend to kill the 
victim. Id. Rather, he testified that he intended only that the victim go 
unconscious. Id. at 36. The jury convicted Fisher of second degree murder, 
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but its general verdict did not specify which of the three variations of 
murder it had relied upon. Id. at 37. 
On appeal, the supreme court upheld the trial court's denial of a 
mistrial on two grounds: first, notwithstanding the prosecutor's opening 
statement, other "independent, credible evidence" sufficed to support a jury 
verdict on the first variation, that Fisher intended to kill the victim. Id. 
Second, and "[m]ore importantly," the evidence amply supported a jury 
verdict on the second variation- i.e., intent to commit serious bodily 
injury-where Fisher "testified that he intentionally placed his hands on the 
victim's neck, that he intentionally squeezed her throat, and that he 
intended to 'get her to go unconscious."' Id. The supreme court explained 
that Fisher "intentionally committed an act that is dangerous to human life 
(strangulation), intending to cause serious bodily injury (protracted loss or 
impairment of both the heart and the brain, i.e., unconsciousness)." Id. The 
supreme court therefore held that "strangulation constitutes 'serious bodily 
injury."' Id. Given the factual context, Fisher's holding may be more 
precisely read as being that strangulation that results in unconsciousness is 
serious bodily injury. See id. The court then observed that its holding was 
"consistent with the case law on this question," citing, e.g., State v. King, 604 
P.2d 923 (Utah 1979), where it had upheld a jury finding of '"serious bodily 
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injury'" in an aggravated sexual assault case where King strangled the 
victim to unconsciousness and stabbed her with scissors. Fisher, 680 P.2d at 
37, n.3. 
Shortly after Fisher was decided, the supreme court decided State v. 
Peterson, 681 P.2d 1210 (Utah 1984), an aggravated assault case. Peterson 
broke in to the victim's home and strangled her, causing her to "black out" 
briefly. Id. at 1219. On appeal, Peterson challenged the trial court's refusal 
to reduce his aggravated assault conviction to a simple assault. Id. at 1218. 
He argued that the evidence did not show that he caused serious bodily 
injury to the victim where she required no medical attention and suffered 
no II permanent disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment of the 
functions of any bodily member or organ." Id. at 1218-1219. He further 
argued that what bodily injury she did suffer II did not create a substantial 
risk of death." Id. at 1219. 
But the issue in Peterson was not whether the defendant caused 
serious bodily injury. Rather, the issue was only whether he used means or 
force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury, because the 
prosecution had a1nended the Information to charge only that variant of 
aggravated assault. Id. The supreme court affirmed Peterson's aggravated 




around her neck and applied sufficient pressure to cause her to black out," 
which conduct "clearly could have caused the death or serious bodily injury 
of [the victim] and was therefore sufficient under the statute." Id. Peterson 
thus recognizes that strangulation is at least "means or force likely to cause 
serious bodily injury." Id. Granted, in reaching this result, Peterson neither 
cited to nor acknowledged Fisher. But there was no reason to do so, where, 
unlike in Fisher, the State did not have to prove that Peterson intended to, or 
actually caused, serious bodily injury. Peterson, 681 P.2d at 1219. 
A few years later, in State v. Speer, 750 P.2d 186, 191 (Utah 1988), the 
supreme court reaffirmed that strangulation constitutes means or force 
likely to cause death or serious bodily injury, even when the victim does not 
go unconscious. Speer broke into his former wife's home and assaulted her 
in various ways, including dragging her by her hair back inside the home 
when she tried to escape and grabbing her by the throat-choking her. Id. 
at 188. When Mrs. Speer received a phone call during the incident, Speer 
"threw down the phone and knocked her against a dresser." Id. The caller, 
overhearing the struggle, called police. Id. Speer was arrested shortly 
thereafter, and his former wife was "taken to the hospital, where she was 
treated and released." Id. 
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At trial, Speer testified and "admitted choking Mrs. Speer about the 
throat until, by her testimony, she almost passed out." Id. at 191. The trial 
court instructed the jury on "aggravated assault, aggravated burglary, 
aggravated kidnapping, and kidnapping." Id. at 188. Speer did not request 
or receive instructions on the lesser included offenses of burglary or assault. 
Id. The aggravated assault instruction included the "means or force likely to 
produce death or serious bodily injury" ele1nent. Id. The jury ultimately 
acquitted Speer of kidnapping, but convicted him of both aggravated 
burglary and aggravated assault. Id. 
On appeal, Speer argued that the trial court committed manifest error 
in not insh~ucting the jury "on lesser included offenses of simple assault and 
simple burglary." Id. at 190. The supreme court rejected Speer's argument, 
holding that "under our statutory requirements," Speer "would not have 
been entitled to instructions on the lesser offenses, even if he had requested 
them." Id. A court is not "'obligated to charge the jury with respect to an 
included offense unless there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the 
defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the included 
offense."' Id. (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(4) (1978)). The supreme 
court held that there was no rational basis for acquitting Speer of 
aggravated assault and convicting him of only assault because it was 
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"uncontroverted" that Speer-who had admitted choking his former wife-
"used 'force likely to cause death or serious bodily injury,' thereby 
satisfying the requirements" of the aggravated assault statute, section 76-5-
103(1)(b) (" other means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily 
injury"). Speer, 750 P.2d at 190. In support, the supreme court cited Fisher, 
680 P.2d at 37, where it had earlier held that "strangulation constitutes 
'serious bodily injury."' Id. at 191, n.4. 
Fisher held that strangling a victim to unconsciousness constitutes 
serious bodily injury as a matter of law. 680 P.2d at 37. Speer recognized 
the validity of this holding. See 750 P.2d at 191, n.4. Instruction 18 therefore 
correctly stated the law. 
Defendant nevertheless disputes that strangulation to 
unconsciousness is serious bodily injury as a matter of law, citing a 
sufficiency case from the supreme court, State v. King, 604 P.2d 923 (Utah 
1979), two cases from this court, State v. Bloomfield, 2003 UT App 3, 63 P.3d 
110 and State v. Boone, 820 P.2d 930 (Utah App. 1991), "extra-jurisdictional 
cases/' and Utah's "non-criminal code." See Aplt.Br.19-25. Defendant's 
reliance on these authorities is unavailing. 
First, Defendant argues that King somehow limits Fisher, or that Fisher 
did not hold that strangulation to unconsciousness is serious bodily injury 
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as a matter of law because it relied on King, and other extra-jurisdictional 
cases, all of which were only sufficiency cases. See Aplt.Br.19. But Fisher's 
reliance on King and other sufficiency cases does not limit Fisher. The Fisher 
court held that any error regarding the prosecutor's opening statement in 
that case was harmless because Fisher's admission- that he intended to 
strangle the murder victim to unconsciousness - established as a matter of 
law that he committed second degree murder. See 680 P.2d at 37. The 
supreme court's citation to King and the other sufficiency cases supports, 
but does not limit this holding. Indeed, the error in Fisher could not have 
been harmless if a factual issue remained about whether Fisher had 
admitted an intent to cause serious bodily injury. See id. 
Defendant next argues that a case from this Court, Bloomfield, 
somehow limits the supreme court cases, Fisher and Speer, and that another 
case from this Court, Boone, limits yet another supreme court case, Peterson. 
See Aplt.Br.21. But even assuming that Defendant correctly characterizes 
Bloomfield and Boone, neither case could limit authority from a higher 
court-i.e. the Utah Supreme Court. See State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 399, 
n.3 (Utah 1994) (recognizing "lower courts are obliged to follow the holding 
of a higher court" under vertical stare decisis). 
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In Bloomfield, the defendant beat the victiln to unconsciousness - the 
victim did not regain consciousness until the next day- and the question on 
appeal was whether beating someone to unconsciousness satisfied the 
"serious bodily injury" ele1nent of aggravated robbery. 2003 UT App 3, if 18. 
As Defendant points out, Bloomfield observes that no Utah case had 
previously addressed this question directly. See id. ("No Utah cases have 
directly addressed this question."); see also Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-101(11) 
(defining serious bodily injury).6 However, Bloomfield goes on to recognize 
that II several" cases" suggest that a jury may find that an assault resulting in 
temporary unconsciousness meets the statutory definition of serious bodily 
injury." Id. (citing, e.g., Peterson, 681 P.2d 1219, and Fisher, 680 P.2d at 37). 
Bloomfield thus correctly holds that it was '"within the province of the jury 
to consider the means and n1anner by which the victim's injuries were 
inflicted along with the attendant circumstances' in determining whether 
Bloomfield caused serious bodily injury." Id. The Court upheld 
Blo01n£ield's aggravated robbery conviction because the evidence "was 
sufficient for the jury to detennine that [Blo01n£ield' s] beating" of the victim 
6 The State cites the current s tatute which has been renumbered since 
Bloomfield was decided. 
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"caused serious bodily in.jury within the meaning of" the aggravated 
robbery and serious bodily injury statutes . Id. 
In arguing that Bloomfield somehow lilnits Fisher and Speer, 
Defendant apparently reads Bloomfield's holding that "a jury may find that 
an assault resulting in te1nporary unconsciousness" is serious bodily injury, 
to mean that a jury may also find to the contrary-i.e., that it is not serious 
bodily injury. See Aplt.Br.22-23. Defendant then posits that the Bloomfield 
court's observation that no Utah case had directly addressed the question 
whether beating someone to unconsciousness is serious bodily injury 
s01nehow limits Fisher and Speer. See Aplt.Br.22-23. But this observation 
does no such thing. 
Turning fist to Fisher, the issues in Fisher and Bloomfield were distinct. 
As explained, Fisher held that sh·angulation to unconsciousness is serious 
bodily injury because that act directly causes protracted loss or impainnent 
of both the heart and brain. Fisher, 680 P.2d at 37. Bloomfield addressed a 
different question-i.e., whether beating someone to unconsciousness is 
serious bodily injury. Bloomfield, 2003 UT App 3, ,118. Thus, Bloomfield's 
observation that no court, including the Fisher court, had addressed this 
precise question does not somehow lin1it Fisher. Rather, Fisher supports the 
Bloomfield holding. If, as Fisher holds, sh·angulation to unconscious is 
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serious bodily injury as a matter of law, see Fisher, 680 P.2d at 37, then an 
assault resulting in unconsciousness is necessarily serious bodily injury as a 
matter of law, see Bloomfield, 2003 UT App 3, if 18. In any event, Bloomfield is 
a decision of a lower court and thus could not- even if it purported to -
limit Fisher. See Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 399, n.3. 
The same holds true for Defendant's suggestion that Bloomfield limits 
Speer, which case Bloomfield does not even cite to or acknowledge. See 
Bloomfield, 2003 UT App 3, ,118; see also Aplt.Br.21. Speer, like Fish.er, 
addressed a different issue than Bloomfied. The issue in Speer was whether 
strangulation is means or force likely to cause serious bodily injury. See 
Speer, 750 P.2d at 191. Thus, Bloomfield's recognition that beating someone 
to unconsciousness is serious bodily injury does not limit Speer. Rather, 
Speer reinforces Bloomfield's holding that it is within the province of a jury to 
find that an assault that results in unconsciousness is serious bodily injury. 
2003 UT App 3, if 18. But again, even if Bloomfield had purported to do so, it 
could not limit Speer. See Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 399, n.3. 
As for Defendant's reliance on Boone, he incorrectly characterizes 
Boone as a supreme court opinion that purports to limit another supreme 
court opinion, Peterson. See Aplt.Br.21. But Boone is a court of appeals case; 
thus, even if Boone purported to limit Peterson it could not have done so. See 
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Menzies, 889 P.2d at 399, n.3. Moreover, Boone is an aggravated burglary 
case that turned on the definition of "bodily injury," not "serious bodily 
injury." See Boone, 820 P.2d at 936. In any event, to the extent that 
Defendant reasonably characterizes Boone as suggesting that Peterson "noted 
that strangulation to the point of brief unconsciousness did not constitute 
serious bodily injury," Aplt.Br.21 (citing Boone, 820 P.2d at 936), both 
Defendant and Boone mischaracterize Peterson. 
As shown, Peterson interpreted a former version of the aggravated 
assault statute and recognized that while one subsection of that statute 
required proof of intent to cause serious bodily injury, the subsection 
Peterson was charged under required "only that the actor used means or 
force likely to have that result." Peterson, 681 P.2d at 1219. Thus, the 
supreme court was not asked to consider-and did not have to decide-if 
strangulation with unconsciousness constituted serious bodily injury in 
Peterson. Id. 
Finally, Defendant's reliance on "extra-jurisdictional cases not cited in 
Fisher," and Utah's "non-criminal code" is as unavailing as his reliance on 
King, Bloomfield, and Boone. Aplt.Br.20,25. Regardless of what courts in 
other states may have decided, Fisher controls in Utah and has interpreted 
section 76-1-601(11) to mclude strangulation to unconsciousness as a matter 
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of law. See Fisher, 680 P.2d at 37. It is similarly insignificant that the other 
definitions of serious bodily injury in Utah's criminal or civil code may or 
may not expressly include unconsciousness. Section 76-1-601(11) controls 
the definition of serious bodily injury for purposes of the aggravated assault 
statute and the Utah Supreme Court has interpreted that section to include 
strangulation to unconsciousness. See Fisher, 680 P.2d at 37. 
Given all of the above, the trial court's strangulation instruction was a 
correct statement of Utah law that this Court must uphold. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted on March 23, 2016. 
SEAN D. REYES 
Utah Attorney General 
~~~-
~IANDECKER 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for A ppellee 
-27-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on March 23, 2016, two copies of the Brief of Appellee 
were □ mailed 0 hand-delivered to: 
Lori J. Seppi 
Michael R. Sikora 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Also, in accordance with Utah Supreme Court Standing Order No. 8, 
a courtesy brief on CD in searchable portable document format (pdf): 
0 was filed with the Court and served on appellant. 















§ 76-5-103. Aggravated assault--Penalties, UT ST§ 76-5-103 
KeyCite Yellow Flag - Negative Treatment 
Proposed Legislation 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 76. Utah Criminal Code 
Chapter 5. Offenses Against the Person (Refs & Annos) 
Part 1. Assault and Related Offenses 
U.C.A. 1953 § 76-5-103 
§ 76-5-103. Aggravated assault--Penalties 
Currentness 
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Chapter 1. General Provisions (Refs & Annas) 
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§ 76-1-601. Definitions 
Currentness 
Unless otherwise provided, the following terms apply to this title: 
(1) "Act" means a voluntary bodily movement and includes speech. 
(2) "Actor" means a person whose criminal responsibility is in issue in a criminal action . 
(3) "Bodily injury" means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition. 
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(5) "Dangerous weapon" means: 
(a) any item capable of causing death or serious bodily injury; or 
(b) a facsimile or representation of the item, if: 
(i) the actor's use or apparent intended use of the item leads the victim to reasonably believe the item is likely to cause 
death or serious bodily injury; or 
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(d) object rape ofa child, Section 76-5-402.3; 
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(t) sodomy on a child, Section 76-5-403.1; 
• (g) aggravated sexual abuse of a child, Subsection 76-5-404.1(4); 
(h) aggravated sexual assault, Section 76-5-405; 
• 
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described in Subsections (6)(a) through (i). e 
(7) "Offense" means a violation of any penal statute of this state. 
(8) "Omission" means a failure to act when there is a legal duty to act and the actor is capable of acting. 
(9) "Person" means an individual, public or private corporation, government, partnership, or unincorporated association. 
(10) "Possess" means to have physical possession of or to exercise dominion or control over tangible property. 
(11) "Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates or causes serious permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or 
impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ, or creates a substantial risk of death. 
(12) "Substantial bodily injury" means bodily injury, not amounting to serious bodily injury, that creates or causes protracted 
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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; FEBRUARY 24, 2015 
JUDGE MARK KOURIS 
(Transcriber's note: Identification of speakers 
may not be accurate with the audio recordings.) 
PROCEEDINGS 
THE COURT: Good morning. I've assembled, as you 
can see, 1 preliminary set of instructions that I put 
together _ast night that you can look through when you have a 
minute. :hat said, I know that we want to talk about the 
strangulation instruction that Mr. Leavitt has offered. I've 
had a chance to read both cases that you refer to last night. 
I guess, Mr. Sikora, response to that? 
MR. SIKORA: Yes, just one moment, Your Honor. 
Your Honor, I think the appropriate instruction to 
inform th8 jury of what serious bodily injury is, is actually 
the definition of serious bodily injury under Utah law which 
is 76-1-6)1(11) and that definition is, uThe term serious 
bodily injury means bodily injury that creates or causes 
serious p·~rmanent disfigurement, protracted loss or 
• impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ or 
I 
creates a substantial risk of death. I think what the State 
has done :here is taken a case, that particular factual 
pattern in a case and then interweaved that factual pattern 
with the jury instruction that it wants and I don't th~nk 




























THE COURT: Let me ask by the same token, it seems 
like you' re done a very similar thing with regard to all the 
self defe1se instructions. Why -
MR. SIKORA: The self defense 
THE COURT: - don't we just take the self defense 
statutory instruction and give that to them? 
MR. SIKORA: Well, I'm going to be removing that 
anyway because we're not going to be running that defense. 
I THE COURT: Oh, okay. 
MR. SIKORA: Yeah, but most of the.defense - and 
I'd have to know, you know, which ones you're talking about 
because s,.,me of those I am just parroting the statute. 
THE COURT: Right, but there are others that co~e 
directly )Ut of cases that you pulled. 
MR. SIKORA: That may be. The problem now is we're 
talking a)out an element. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. SIKORA: We're talking about an element of'the 
offense which is the jury has to find serious bodily injury 
in order to convict my client. Now, what is happening is 
there is a particular factual scenario that the Court is 
telling the jury in that jury instruction, this is serious 
bodily ir.: jury. 
THE COURT: But isn't that what the Supreme Court 



























Supreme Court in that one instance has said this is the 
definition and by the way, this qualifies under the 
definition, right? 
MR. SIKORA: Well, the question then becomes, is 
that really - I'm not sure though that's what the Suprem~ 
Court is 3aying in those two cases. 
THE COURT: Oh, okay. 
MR. SIKORA: Okay. Because what the Supreme Court 
is not sa,ing in either of those cases is that they're not 
making th1t connection to an appropriate jury instruction in 
a given criminal case. They're saying based on our review of 
this person's conviction, we believe that the conviction 
should be affirmed and that under the circumstances 
presented, the choking in this case rises to the level of 
serious bodily injury. 
I think if you read that too far, you're then 
saying th3t a defense, the defendant is actually foreclosed 
from even arguing otherwise in a case. It almost appears as 
sort of, you know, to look at the civil prospective of it, 
it's almo;t being used as fact preclusion or collateral 
estoppel, that now we're being estopped from even arguing 
that choking to the point of unconsciousness, if that's what 
happened,· rises to the level of serious bodily injury. The 
jury is being told that choking to the point of 





























You're ba3ically taking that factual decision that the jurors 
have to m~ke on that particular element out of their hands 
and I thi .1k it runs very close then at that point to 
violating my client's right to have the jury find unanimously 
and beyonj a reasonable doubt of every element of the offense 
because it almost is getting very close and maybe is the 
equivaler,t of a judicial finding and then dictating to the 
jury, this has already been proven. That's my concern with 
that particular element, that I think it does run very close, 
if not ov~r the line of violating my client's constitutional 
right to ceasonable doubt on every element of the offense. 
THE COURT: Well, if we argue it backwards then, 
are you s 1ying that there's a possibility that you could_. 
choke a p~rson to unconsciousness and there could be a 
situation where that would not be serious bodily injury? 
MR. SIKORA: Yes, I am and that's -
THE COURT: Tell me what -
MR. SIKORA: - that's -
THE COURT: - that would -
MR. SIKORA: - what my medical expert will talk 
about. I've designated Dr. Rothfeder as my expert in this 
case and ·11e 's going to say that there are ways that 
unconsciousness might occur after a very short period of 
time, eve·,1 10 seconds which is what the evidence is in this-



























the pressure is released, everything goes back to normal and 
there is no serious bodily injury. So the one thing - t~at's 
the other thing, in that particular - in neither of those 
cases doe~ it appear that there was any scientific evidence, 
it looks Like the appellate court just sort of concluded 
based on .~o particular science that serious bodily injury 
results f.,:om choking to the point of unconsciousness. 
of those ·:ases I'm not sure that unconsciousness even 
occurred as I recall. 
In one 
Here's some of the examples I want to bring up. If 
f .. :·. ~ 
this is legitimate, if this is a kosher way of creating a Q 
jury instruction, of blending the facts with the law, then I, 
we'd also get into that situation with, let's say the way I 
was thinking about it in terms of cruel and heinous murder 
under the aggravated assault statute. If you have a case 
that says\nine stab wounds equals cruel and heinous murder, 
then you -:ould have another aggravated murder case subsequent 
to that w:1ere maybe there were 12 stab wounds and the jury 
would be told in a jury instruction, you are, you are 
instructej that nine or more stab wounds to the back equals 
cruel and heinous murder. There are any number of examples 
of that that you can come up with where you have a reported 
case that the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals has decided 
and they've decided it on a particular set of facts and then 
































prosecuti)n's case and then form a jury instruction based on 
the set o: facts in that case. I don't think that that's an 
appropriate way to inform the jury and I think it's an 
unconstitutional way of informing the jury. 
I think that my client has a right to present the 
evidence, the jury is the fact finder, this isn't a civil 
case and the jury has to make that determination of proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt on each and every element of the 
offense without basically, you know, the Court taking 
judicial notice of a particular set of facts and informing 
the jury that this set of facts has this legal consequence 
I 
i 
and I thi1k that's what that jury instruction does. 
The other part of it is if you look at the State's 
instructi~n, the first paragraph talks about force of means 
likely to cause death or serious bodily injury. 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. SIKORA: And I'm not sure that the cases support 
that. I think that the cases do talk about strangulation to 
I 
the point of unconsciousness. That first part of it though, 
I don't k\1ow - and maybe I read those cases sort of quickly 
but it se~med to me that's, that was for the most part what 
they were: talking about was the unconsciousness problem, but 
I may be ~rong about that. 
THE COURT: Mr. Leavitt? 



























again a ~uick factual background, what we have a good faith 
belief th~t the evidence is going to show in this case. : I 
believe t~e testimony of a couple of witnesses is that, 
indeed, t·!1e allegations are that Mr. Walker, the defendant, 
strangledithe victim in this case until her eyes rolled back 
i 
in her he1d, her body went limp and she fell to the floor, 
indicating everything, every level of unconsciousness. That, 
yes, is v2ry similar to these cases but what the Court is not 
doing by ~iving this instruction is making a finding for 
them. Wh3t the Court is doing is instructing them on what 
the actual law is in the state of Utah. 
For example, in Fisher - and do you have a copy 
with you? 
THE COURT: I do. 
MR. LEAVITT: I've got a courtesy copy if you need 
one. You all ... okay. 
So, in Fisher what that was - and a lot of Mr. 
Sikora's example, those are sufficiency of the evidence 
cases. If someone was convicted of something and then they 
appealed and they said there wasn't sufficient evidence to 
convict me of this charge and then the Court affirmed it. 
That's not the situation here. What Fisher was, Fisher ,vas a 
murder ca~e and he had strangled someone and her neck snapped 
and she died. At trial Mr. Fisher was claiming he didn't 



























- of this language in Fisher and it's on, I guess Page 4 of 
the West Law printout, it's just right before Page 38 of:the 
Reporter, they get two different ways of proving murder. 
Intention~l murder, but then there's also this, an act 
clearly dangerous to human life intending to cause serious 
bodily injury. So this wasn't a sufficiency of the evidence. 
He was cl1iming that I didn't intend to, that he didn't 
intend to kill them and actually the context of this is that 
•. 
the prosecutor's statements whether about intent were 
imperfect. That's the context of this discussion and wh~t 
the Court does is the Court says, Look, yeah, what the 
prosecutor said that witness didn't testify but it doesn't 
matter because clearly, under these facts, it wouldn't have 
made a difference because then they go into this definition 
of serious bodily injury. And the context, they're 
interpreting a statute. That's what the law is. There's 
statutes ind then the courts interpret those statutes and 
that also becomes - that's what a holding is. That's how we 
do it and here they're interpreting that statute, serious 
bodily injury, the exact definition that Mr. Sikora is 
proposing the exact definition in the statute and then they 
give the definition and they say, "the defendant's conduct 
falls squarely within the (inaudible) second degree murder. 
He testified he intentionally placed his hands on her neck, 



























unconscid1s. In other words, the defendant intentionally 
committed an act endangering life, strangulation, intending 
to cause ;erious bodily injury, i.e. protracted loss or 
irnpairmen~ of both the heart and brain, i.e. 
unconsciousness." So they talk about strangulation and 
unconsciousness. 
Now, is this dicta? Is this their reasoning? 
After that look at the words, uour holding that strangulation 
constitutes serious bodily injury is consistent with case law 
on the question" and then they cite cases from other 
jurisdictLons. Now, is there a question that was a holding? 
They used the word holding. The court's holding 
unconscio.1sness is serious bodily injury. If there was any 
question, the same court, Utah Supreme Court, four years 
later in Spear had an issues come up where a victim was 
strangled until she almost passed out and on that one the 
context of this one -
Do you both have a copy of this one as well? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. LEAVITT: Okay. The context of the Spear case 
is dealinq with a submitted, proposed jury instruction by the 
defendant. He had requested an assault jury instruction_ 
because a1ain I believe that under the theory that it was a 
force lik~ly to cause death or serious bodily injury and so 



























evidence, it's a - sorry - and it's on Page 9 and Page 191 of 
the Pacific Reporter, this isn't sufficiency of the evidence. 
This is whether or not that instruction was appropriate. 
So again, that test is going to be could a jury 
reasonabl: acquit the defendant of the greater and convict 
him of th: lesser and the court, if there was any question 
that this is a holding, that this is an actual law that's set 
by this s~me court, the court in that one said - and it's 
marked as Paragraph 11, uAs for aggravated assault, the 
defendant admitted to choking Ms. Spear, choking Ms. Spear 
about the throat until her - and by her testimony, she almost 
passed out. This uncontroverted testimony establishes that 
he used force likely to cause death or serious bodily injury; 
thereby satisfying the requirements. And if we wonder if 
Fisher is an actual binding case law, they cite Fisher in 
that foot~ote and say where we held strangulation constitutes 
serious b1)dily injury. It's pretty clear what the state of 
the law i 3. 
Now let's talk about what this instruction doesn't 
do. This instruction doesn't take away from the jury. 
not the Court taking judicial notice of a certain fact. 
That's absolutely not what it's doing. It's the Court 
It's 
instructjng the jury on what the law is in the state of Utah. 
If the instruction said you are instructed that Ann Hilton 




























You' re in·,tructed that Mr. Walker used force or means likely 
to cause death or serious bodily injury, that's what that 
would be. This is an instruction on what the law is. The 
jury is still the finder of fact. That's the law. The facts 
that they hear from the stand, they apply to that law. The 
jury still has to determine whether or not she was - whether 
or not they believe she was strangled, whether or not she 
actually ~ent unconscious, whether they believe any of the 
story at 111, whether they believe any of the witnesses. 
It's like any other element that we have to prove. The 
jury's go_ng to apply the facts they hear during this trial 
and see ii they match what the law says. 
THE COURT: So the expert that Mr. Sikora is 
talking about then will be testifying on something that would 
be completely contrary to the law; is that right? 
MR. LEAVITT: Exactly. He shouldn't be able to do 
that. Either way, Dr. Rothfeder can't come in here and say 
she didn't suffer serious bodily injury, he can't say that. 
That's a legal definition. What he can come in - he can talk 
about the physiology of what happens to the body and whether 
or not, y1u know, what happens when someone goes unconscious. 
He certai,ly - even if this instruction is not given, he's 
not going to come in and say she suffered serious bodily 
injury. He's going to talk about what a doctor can talk 





























in and say unconsciousness in my opinion is not serious 
bodily injury, I don't think he can do that and I'd object to 
that testLmony. I don't think it's appropriate because the 
law says 3omething and you can't, even if, even if an expert 
is going :o come in and say in their opinion something, if 
their opinion cor.flicts with the law, the law wins. That's 
how it wo-~ks. 
And you know, this isn't, this isn't an abnormal 
situation. For example, let's put it on the other side of 
the table, State vs. Watkins, everyone is pretty familiar 
with that case. It was a case involving an aggravated 
assault - or I'm sorry an aggravated sexual abuse of a child 
where the defendant was charged under the theory of he 
occupied i position of special trust, it was a couple of 
years ago. In that case the defendant was a adult cohabitant 
in the hrr1e which under the definition in the statute is 
someone w.:10 occupies a position of authority. Now that case 
they came out and they said - and they analyzed whether or 
not the statute requires just his position of authority or 
whether or not they have to exercise that authority in order, 
in order to achieve lack of consent of the victim. And what 
they did in that case is they said, Look, the statute 
actually isn't saying this is a position of special trust. 
They' re s-iying - what the statute says is if it's enumerated 



























still has to prove that they exercised that authority, that 
authority, they exercised that undue influence in order for 
the person to give lack of consent and from that day forward 
that, if, if - in that type of case, the instruction has to 
be given, the State still must prove to you that the 
defendant not only occupied a position of special authority 
but exerctsed undue influence over the victim by way of that 
special a·1thority and if the defense asks for that 
instructi.,n, they get it 100 percent of the time because. 
that's wh:it the Court said, that's what the law is. 
And additionally, another example is - a case 
that's near and dear to my heart because it was my case - Joe 
McNairy. It was the Court interpreting the definition, again 
the statutory definition of a dwelling in a burglary case. 
McNairy was charged with burglary of a dwelling but the house 
that he had burglarized was a new construction home, it had 
never been lived in before. At trial, we argued that it was 
a dwellinJ because it's, it's the typical use of the building 
and he wa.~ convicted. He appealed that and the court said, 
No, if, it may be its intended use but no one has ever lived 
in it, it's a building, it's not a dwelling. From that day 
forward, if someone, we can no longer charge a house as a 
dwelling. Now, is there a good faith argument to be made 
that under the definition that a new home of construction is 



























definitio1, can I convince the jury of it, I did; but now I 
don't get to because the Court came down and said this is the 
law. 
So Dr. Rothfeder's testimony isn't appropriate if 
he's goinJ to come and say unconscious is not serious bodily 
injury because that's what the law is. He can certainly.come 
in and talk about physiology, he can come in and talk about 
people surviving, he can talk whatever he wants to but he 
certainly can't say in my opinion this does not constitute 
serious bodily injury because that would be contrary to the 
law. 
The defendant's right to a faiL trial, the 
defendant's right to due process doesn't carry over to argue 
things th1t are against the law. The jury is entitled to be 
instructei on what the appropriate law is and the appropriate 
law in this case is extremely clear via these two cases. 
Further, there's a - in 2010 there was a joint 
resolution as far as the legislature is concerned that dealt 
with strangulation to unconsciousness. They didn't correct 
the law and in the joint resolution, they talk about it and 
encourage - again it says that they encourage prosecutors to 
file thes~ as felonies which again would require force or 
mean likely to cause death or serious bodily injury, if 
unconscio·1sness is bodily injury. And the reasoning behind 



























joint resolution, is on Line 32 of that copy where they· 
actually recognize Spear and Fisher, these two cases, that 
this law in the state of Utah is well settled. The cour~ ha~ 
given us an opinion, they have given us direction on it. It 
isn't just the definition in the statute and then you need to 
argue som~thing that the Supreme Court said is not the case. 
The court has spoken on this, this is an appropriate 
instructiJn because it still gives the jury the province to 
apply the facts that they are going to hear, to decide 
whether or not she was strangled, to decide whether or not 
she did lose consciousness, to decide whether to believe any 
witness at all and even overall just to decide whether or not 
we proved our case beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant 
is still getting every single right he's afforded by the 
Constitution and this instruction is appropriate. 
If you have any questions for me I'd be glad to 
answer th:m. 
THE COURT: Let's see, you have two here, 
strangula~ion to the point of unconsciousness, the one above 
it however says you're instructed strangulation constitutes 
force, means or likely to cause serious bodily injury. 
one is also included in these cases? I thought the 
strangulation part was but the other wasn't I -
That 
MR. LEAVITT: If you look at, if you look at Spear-



























MR. LEAVITT: - I added that after reviewing 
Spears. ~he original instruction I submitted only had 
strangula~ion to the point of unconsciousness, serious bodily 
injury. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. LEAVITT: However, if you look at the Spear 
case, she wasn't unconscious, she almost passed out. And in 
Spear, if you look at that paragraph that I cited, it's right 
above subsection 5 or Roman Numeral V, it says, uas for 
aggravateJ assault, the defendant admitted choking her until, 
by her testimony, she almost passed out. This uncontroverted 
testimony established he used force likely to cause death or 
serious ~Jdily injury, thereby satisfying the requirements of 
that." So that's based on that paragraph there. The 
unconsciousness part is based on that reference to Fisher and 
the case in Fisher. 
THE COURT: All right. Response Mr. Sikora? 
MR. SIKORA: Yes, very briefly. With respect so 
Spears, I mean what isn't quoted in that particular pass~ge 
that Mr. ~eavitt just read out was the choking was also 
combined iith Mr. Spear's statement earlier on that uthis is 
going to be our last day together." So there was definitely 
sort of a, a context there that went well beyond what we.'re 
dealing with here which was a spur of the moment sort of 



























choking, if the choking actually occurred. 
THE COURT: Aren't you arguing just intent now? 
MR. SIKORA: Well, I'm wondering whether intent 
figured into the Court's analysis there. We're not really 




Well, I think the language -
- (inaudible) . 
- says it does because it says he 
intended to get her to go unconscious, right? 
MR. SIKORA: Yes. 
THE COURT: So, so -
MR. SIKORA: Intent and maybe even wanted to kill 
her. 
THE COURT: Right. So if, in fact, you can say he 
grabbed h~r throat because he was trying to stop her from 
falling o~f of a chair, that's one thing; or if he grabbed 
her throa': and pushed his thumbs into her windpipe, maybE~ a 
jury can ~nfer from that that he intended for her to go 
unconscious. It seems like those are issues of fact but the 
reality is that if they conclude that in fact he wanted her 
to go unconscious and she did go unconscious, then it seems 
like this jury instruction would be well taken. 
MR. SIKORA: Well, I agree that what that case says 
is under the facts of this case, under the facts it supports 





























THE CO~RT: Right. 
MR. SIKORA: The question is then, does - is the 
State entitled to that jury instruction? 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. SIKORA: One of the, one of the - another 
example I wanted to say is what if you have a case dealing 
specifically with serious bodily injury, not some other 
context, .Jut serious bodily injury and the reported case is a 
bullet wo1nd to the liver constitutes serious bodily injury 
and they ~ffirm the conviction based on that. Are you then 
entitled ~o the subsequent case involving a bullet wound to 
the liver to a jury instruction that says, you are instructed 
that bullet wound to the liver constitutes serious bodily 
injury? I think that maybe is more parallel to what we're 
dealing with here. I've never seen a jury instruction like 
that. I don't think I ever will see a jury instruction like 
that because that, like in this case, is blending that report 
of - the ~acts of a reported case with the jury instruction 
the way t·1e jury is going to be informed how they should sort 
of struct~re their deliberations. 
With respect to -
THE COURT: Well, let me interrupt you for just one 
sec, and that is the example you give is so specific, where I 
think the strangulation is a little less specific because 



























somebody else's throat. Comment on Mr. Leavitt's point 
concerninJ the dwelling of the house, the fact that the 
statute s '.:ops but the case law then continues and from this 
day forward we argue the case law that that's part of a jury 
instructiJn and why would this be different? 
MR. SIKORA: And we know that. We know that but 
because now we're talking about the constitutional rights of 
the defenjant and to a jury verdict where he is entitled that 
that jury determine proof beyond a reasonable doubt of each 
and every element and my position is that the way this, this 
frames up a little bit differently because now this has the 
real pote1tial of taking that constitutional right away from 
the defeniant because the jury is being directed how to focus 
their del_berations. I think that's the -
THE COURT: Well -
MR. SIKORA: - difference. 
THE COURT: Well, doesn't the, the example given by 
Mr. Leavitt take that providence away from the jury in favor 
impacting the State because the State also has a right too, 
right? 
MR. SIKORA: The State does not have a right under 
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to a jury verdict based on 
proof bey.;nd a reasonable doubt. That is the defendant's 
right, thit's not the State's right. So that is the primary 




























This is not - I don't know if Mr. Leavitt misspoke 
and maybe I heard him wrong but my understanding of this is 
this is a legislative declaration, this is not from the 
Court, this is not judicial -
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. SIKORA: - this is - I'm not sure exactly what 
it is and I understand that they make this sort of joint 
resolutio.1 and here's how they want law enforcement to behave 
and how t.1ey want prosecutors to go after these cases. That 
doesn't m~an that this Court is bound by this particular 
legislative directive. 
THE COURT: I don't think he argued that. 
I do believe that the -
MR. SIKORA: One of the things that -
THE COURT: - oh go ahead. 
MR. SIKORA: - Dr. Rothfeder, if I misspoke before, 
Dr. Rothf~der is not going to opine that choking to the point 
of uncons:iousness does not rise to the level of serious 
bodily iniury. That will not be his - he is just going to 
explain i1 his view sort of the, I hate to use the word 
serious because that's the word in the statute but what the 
sort of different levels of injury are and without making 
that legal conclusion. That will not be his position. I 
don't know if it's Mr. Leavitt's position that if you adopt 



























medical t-~stimony and that you will preclude any medical 
testimony. 
THE COURT: I don't think that's his position. I 
think thac he just can't make a legal conclusion -
MR. LEAVITT: Yeah, it's just going to depend on 
what he says obviously. 
THE COURT: Right. Well, I think that both sides 
are very well taken. I think that the way the case law - and 
I re-read these cases a number of times last night trying to 
wrap my h~ad exactly about what they're saying and I do agree 
that I be~ieve that this is the law of the land starting with 
the Court of Appeals and then ending with the Supreme Court 
that has )een referenced to and I think the second stateinent 
there is a correct statement of law, that is uyou are further 
instructed that strangulation to the point of unconsciousness 
constitutes serious bodily injury" and for that reason, that 
one will be read first. The first line, however, I don't 
think it is - although it is stated in the case, I'm not sure 
that's the holding. So I'm going to eliminate that part of 
it, the second part will be used. 
MR. LEAVITT: And Your Honor, the first 
instructi ms that I submitted, I actually submitted one 
without that first -
THE COURT: Oh, you did? 





INSTRUCTION NO. Jl_ 
"Assault" is: 
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to 
another; or 
(b) a threat, accompanied by a shO'.v of immediate force or violence, to 
do bodily injury to another; or 
( c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes 
bodily injury to another. 
"Bodily injury" means physical pain, illness or an· impairment of physical condition. 
"Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates or causes serious permanent 
disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ, or 
creates a substantial risk of death. 
"Unlawful" means without legal justification. 
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Instruction No. l~ 
The law permits the jury to find an accused guilty of any lesser-included 
offense, which is included in the crime charged in the information, if consistent with 
the facts found by the jury from the evidence. 
In this case, with regard to Count 1, you are permitted to consider both the 
primary offense of Aggravated Assault causing serious bodily injury and the lesser-
included offenses Aggravated Assault and Assault 
If you determine that the defendant is guilty of BOTH the primary offense 
(Aggravated Assault causing serious bodily injury) AND the lesser-included offenses 
(Aggravated Assault and Assault), then you must find the defendant guilty of the 
primary offense (Aggravated Assault causing serious bodily injury). 
Alternatively, if you determine that the defendant is not guilty of the primary 
offense (Aggravated Assault causing serious bodily injury), but guilty of the lessor-
included offenses (Aggravated Assault and Assault), then you must find the 
defendant guilty of the lessor-included offense (Aggravated Assault). 
Alternatively, if you determine that the defendant is not guilty of the primary 
offense (Aggravated Assault causing serious bodily injury), and not guilty of the 
lessor-included offense (Aggravated Assault) but guilty of the lessor-included 
offense (Assault), then you must find the defendant guilty of the lessor-included 
offense (Assault). 
In the alternative, the defendant may be found not guilty of the primary 
offense or the lesser-included offenses. 
000110 
INSTRUCTION NO.~ 
Before you can convict the defendant, Timothy Walker, of the crime of Aggravated 
Assault with Serious Bodily Injury, as charged in Count I of the information, you must find from 
all of the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt, each and every one of the following elements 
of that offense occurring on or about the 15111 of January, 2014, in Salt Lake County, Utah; 
1. That the defendant, Timothy Walker 
2. Intentionaliy, knowingly, or reckiessiy; 
3. Committed an assault on Anne Hilton; and 
4. Used force or means likely to cause death or serious bodily injury; and 
5. The defendant caused serious bodily injury to Anne Hilton. 
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this case, you are convinced of the 
truth of each and every one of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must 
find the defendant guilty of Aggravated Assault as charged in Count I of the information. If, on 
the other hand, you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or more of the 
foregoing elements, then you must find the defendant not guilty of Count I. 
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INSTRUCTION NO.~ 
The defendant, Timothy Walker, is charged in count I with the crime Aggravated Assault 
with Serious Bodily Injury on or about January 151\ 2014. The crime of Aggravated Assault is a 
lesser included offense of Aggravated Assault with Serious Bodily Injury, which you may 
consider instead of count 1. You cannot convict Timothy Walker of the lesser included offense 
of Aggravated Assault unless based on the evidence you find beyond a reasonable doubt each of 
the following elements: 
1. That the defendant, Timothy Walker 
2. Intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly; 
3. Committed an assault on Anne Hilton; and 
4. Used force or means likely to cause death or serious bodily injury. 
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this case, you are convinced of the 
truth of each and every one of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must 
find the defendant guilty of Aggravated Assault. If, on the other hand, you are not convinced 
beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or more of the foregoing elements, then you must find the 
defendant not guilty of Aggravated Assault. 
000112 
rNSTRUCTION NO. ~v 
The defendant, Timothy Walker, is charged in count 1 with the crime Aggravated Assault 
with Serious Bodily Injury on or about January 151\ 2014. The crime of Assault is a lesser 
included offense of Aggravated Assault with Serious Bodily Injury, which you may consider 
instead of count 1. You cannot convict Timothy Walker of the lesser included offense of Assault 
unless based on the evidence you find beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following elements: 
1. That the defendant, Timothy Walker 
2. Intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly; 
3. Committed an act with unlawful force of violence; 
4. Causing bodily injury to another or creating a substantial risk of causing bodily injury 
to another. 
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this case, you are convinced of the 
truth of each and every one of_ the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must 
find the defendant guilty of Aggravated Assault. If, on the other hand, you are not convinced 
beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or more of the foregoing elements, then you must find the 
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